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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case is about a business transaction gone awry, leading, ultimately, to 
Mr. Bennett being imprisoned for an alleged breach of contract. In 2004, Mr. Bennett 
contracted with Mr. LeFave to purchase Mr. LeFave's travel trailer. When Mr. Bennett 
moved out of State without making all of the payments, Mr. LeFave reported the trailer 
missing to the police and the criminal case ensued. Mr. Bennett contends that the State 
failed to provide sufficient evidence that he was guilty of grand theft because it failed to 
demonstrate that Mr. Bennett unlawfully took the property, that Mr. LeFave owned the 
trailer when it was allegedly stolen, and that Mr. Bennett possessed the requisite intent 
to deprive the owner of the trailer or appropriate the trailer. Mr. Bennett also contends 
the district court erred when it ordered a separate concurrent sentence for the persistent 
violator enhancement. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In October 2004, Mr. Bennett entered into a verbal contract with Mr. LeFave to 
purchase Mr. LeFave's travel trailer. (Tr., p.28, L.12 - p.30, L.23, p.96, L.13 - p.97, 
L.9.)1 Mr. Bennett agreed to make payments to Mr. LeFave for the trailer, and 
Mr. LeFave agreed to bring the trailer to Mr. Bennett's friend's property where 
Mr. Bennett was going to be staying. (Tr., p.28, L.12 - p.30, L.23, p.96, L.13 - p.97, 
L.9.) Mr. Bennett made at least one payment toward the trailer; however, he never 
1 For ease of reference, Mr. Bennett has cited the main transcript as "Tr.," the preliminary hearing 
transcript as "Prelim. Hr.," and the transcript of the opening and closing arguments as "Supp. Tr.," 
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made full payment for the trailer. 2 (Tr., p.73, L.1 - p.75.) Mr. Bennett eventually moved 
to Femdale, Washington, taking the travel trailer with him. (Tr., p.104, Ls.5-22.) After 
moving to Femdale, Mr. Bennett contacted Mr. LeFave to provide him with his new 
information. (Tr., p.104, Ls.5-22.) 
Mr. LeFave subsequently contacted law enforcement to pursue criminal actions 
against Mr. Bennett and to have the trailer registered as stolen. (Tr., p.49, L.23 - p.50, 
L.15.) Mr. Bennett was charged by Information with Grand Theft for wrongfully taking 
Mr. Lafave's travel trailer on or about October 30, 2004, violating Idaho Code §§ 18-
2403(1) and 18-2407(1 )(b). (R., pp.20-21.) An Information Part II was subsequently 
filed by the State charging Mr. Bennett with being a persistent violator. (R., pp.32-33.) 
The case eventually proceeded to trial. 
At trial, Mr. LeFave testified that in 2004 he owned a 1962 travel trailer, for which 
he had paid a little under $400. (Tr., p.20, Ls.4-14.) He testified that when he 
purchased it, the trailer was in poor condition, but he rebuilt the inside by installing new 
paneling, building a closet, moving the cooking facilities to the back, and making it 
wheelchair accessible. (Tr., p.20, Ls.4-14, p.22, L.23 - p.23, L.2.) Mr. LeFave 
eventually decided to sell the trailer. (Tr., p.28, Ls.2-4.) Mr. LeFave testified that he 
advertised the trailer for sale at $1800. (Tr., p.28, Ls.5-11.) Mr. Bennett contacted 
Mr. LeFave to purchase the trailer, and Mr. LeFave met Mr. Bennett at the T and A 
Truck Stop to discuss the trailer and to confirm that this was where Mr. Bennett was 
working. (Tr., p.28, Ls.12-18.) According to Mr. LeFave, he agreed to sell the trailer to 
Mr. Bennett for $1,500, he agreed to tow the trailer to where Mr. Bennett would be 
staying, and he agreed that Mr. Bennett could make payments on the trailer rather than 
2 The number of payments and the amount outstanding was disputed at trial as discussed below. 
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pay the $1,500 up front. (Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.30, L.2.) Mr. LeFave testified that after he 
towed the trailer to the specified property, he put a chain on the trailer and a "tongue 
hitch lock system," and he told Mr. Bennett "if it would be moved, I would come out and 
move it personally so I would know where it was at all times." (Tr., p.29, L.24 - p.30, 
L.6, p.30, Ls.5-17.) Under the terms of the agreement, once Mr. Bennett finished 
paying for the trailer, he would receive the title, according to Mr. LeFave. (Tr., p.30, 
Ls.20-23.) 
Mr. LeFave also testified that Mr. Bennett was not even required to make a down 
payment at the time Mr. Bennett received the trailer, instead he told Mr. Bennett "We'll 
just work on a few months to let you get build up, then we'll do it." (Tr., p.29, Ls.4-12.) 
Mr. LeFave testified that during the course of his dealing with Mr. Bennett, he never 
received any payments from Mr. Bennett, although Mr. LeFave's wife had received one 
payment. (Tr., p.31, Ls.9-16} His wife later testified that Mr. Bennett came to her 
place of work and made a payment for an uncertain amount, possibly $200-$300. 
(Tr., p.73, L.1 - p.75, L.9.) Mrs. LeFave also testified that she was present when the 
agreement was originally entered into at the T and A Truck Stop, but she could not 
remember if any money was exchanged at that time or the terms of the agreement. 
(Tr., p.75, L.25 - p.77, L.20.) 
Mr. LeFave eventually became aware the trailer had been moved when he 
received a phone call from "Mike or Mike's wife"4 stating the trailer was not there 
anymore. (Tr., p.31, Ls.7-12.) Mr. LeFave went to the lot to investigate, looked over the 
3 At the preliminary hearing, Mr. LeFave testified that he had never received any payments from 
Mr. Bennett, never mentioning the payment to Mr. LeFave's wife. (Tr., p.58, L.11 - p.66, LA; Prelim. Hr. 
Tr, p.11, L.5-p.12, L.5.) 
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fence from the outside, did not see the trailer, and then "went home and proceeded to 
take the legal means into it." (Tr., p.32, Ls.15-17l According to Mr. LeFave, several 
months later he received a phone call from Mr. Bennett stating if he sent him the title, he 
would send him $1,000 and "[ilf I got the police involved, he would burn it." (Tr., p.33, 
L.5 - p.34, L.3.) After contacting law enforcement, Mr. LeFave decided to send 
Mr. Bennett a certified letter telling him to send the cash first and then he would send 
the title. (Tr., p.34, Ls.5-8l He determined what information needed to go into the 
letter after contacting Officer Jones in reference to the travel trailer. (Tr., p.49, L.23 -
p.50, L.16.)7 Mr. LeFave also testified that he knew where to send the letter because 
Mr. Bennett had given Mr. LeFave his address over the phone when he had called. 
(Tr., p.46, L.19 - p.47, L.7.) Unfortunately, Mr. Bennett never received this letter 
because it was returned to Mr. LeFave stating it had not been picked up, possibly 
because it was addressed to "Mr. Betten" or "Mr. Bittin" rather than Mr. Bennett. 
(Tr., p.34, Ls.5-20, p.36, LS.16-23, p.47, Ls.21-22; State's Exhibit 2; State's Exhibit 3.) 
4 It is not clear from the testimony at trial, who exactly "Mike" is, although no objection was ever raised to 
referencing his name and the State never asked any questions to clarify the identity. 
5 Notably, this testimony is contradictory to Mr. LeFave's testimony a few moments later at trial when he 
testified that he and "Mike" went into the backyard to look around and found the upper part of the lock 
system he placed on the hitch. (Tr., p.32, L.21 - p.33, L.2.) This is also contradictory to Mr. LeFave's 
later testimony that Mr. Bennett called him several months later asking for the title and, after that call, 
Mr. LeFave pursued criminal charges. (Tr., p.33, L.5 - p.34, L.3.) 
6 The actual letter allegedly sent made no mention of exchanging money for the title, stating on "This 
letter serves notice that 10 days after receipt, MY trailer vin A98323478 will be entered N.C.I.C. as a 
stolen vehicle! If you have any Questions you can contact Officer Jones with the Boise Police 
Department." (State's Exhibit 3.) Notably, there were actually two letters contained in State's Exhibit 3 
with very similar language, one of which was allegedly sent to Mr. Bennett (or Betten, as the envelope 
was addressed). (State's Exhibit 2; State's Exhibit 3.) Mr. LeFave testified that he could not remember 
which of the two letters were actually sent to Mr. Bennett. (Tr., p.35, Ls.16-23.) Because the language is 
almost identical and the exhibit was admitted without objection, counsel on appeal, has quoted the 
language from the first letter. (State's Exhibit 3; See Tr., p.36, Ls.9-13.) 
7 The demand letter, which purports to reference the VIN #, actually references the title number 
A98323478. (State's Exhibit 1; State's Exhibit 3; Tr., p.53, Ls.3-24.) 
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According to Mr. LeFave he also traveled with "Mike" to the address on the letter and 
discovered that Mr. Bennett was no longer at the address. (Tr., p.37, Ls.11-19.) 
At trial Carolyn Ellinger confirmed that she had allowed Mr. Bennett to park the 
travel trailer on her property in OctoberlNovember 2004. (Tr., p.82, Ls.16-23.) She 
testified that although the trailer was chained to a fence it was not locked. (Tr., p.83, 
Ls.8-16.) Ms. Ellinger testified that a couple months later, Mr. Bennett advised 
Ms. Ellinger that he would be moving. (Tr., p.83, l,24 - p.84, l,12.) He had obtained a 
second job helping a handicapped person and he would be living there with the trailer 
(Tr., p.83, l,24 - p.84, l,7.) Later that evening, Mr. Bennett and the trailer were gone. 
(Tr., p.84, Ls.9-12.) 
At trial, Mr. Bennett testified that the sign on the trailer advertised the price as 
$1000 and that he had agreed to pay Mr. LeFave $850 for it. (Tr., p.96, Ls.13-20.) 
Mr. Bennett paid $150 on the day the transaction was entered into and he made 
payments every two weeks after that when he received his check. (Tr., p.97, Ls.1-9.) 
Mr. Bennett testified that he made payments of $150 on 11/1/2004 and $300 on 
11/15/04 to Mr. LeFave at the truck stop, and $150 on 11/17104 to Mrs. LeFave at her 
place of work. (Tr., p.98, Ls.15-20, p.99, L14 - p.100, l,6, p.100, l,23 - p.101, U5.) 
Mr. Bennett testified that when he made the last payment to Mrs. LeFave, she said the 
title had been ordered and it was agreed when the title came in he would make the final 
payment in exchange for the title. (Tr., p.102, Ls.11-25.) Mr. Bennett also testified that 
when he started his second job, Mr. LeFave moved the trailer for him from Ms. Ellinger's 
property to the new location where he would be working and Mr. Bennett advised him at 
that time he might be moving again. (Tr., p.110, l,18 - p.111, L16.) Finally, 
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Mr. Bennett testified that when he moved to Femdale, Washington he contacted 
Mr. LeFave with his address and inquired again about the title. (Tr., p.i04, Ls.5-22.) 
Mr. Bennett was ultimately convicted by the jury of grand theft and stipulated that 
he was a persistent violator. (Tr., p.i45, LA - p.i49, L.i2; R., ppA6, 50.) Mr. Bennett 
filed a pro se Notice of Appeal following the jury's verdict. (R., pp.5i-57.) Counsel for 
Mr. Bennett also filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal arguing that "[t)he inculpatory 
evidence presented on the material element of value was so insubstantial that jurors 
could not help but have a reasonable doubt as to the proof of that element." (R., pp.58-
59, 62-64.) At the hearing on the motion, counsel for Mr. Bennett argued that because 
of the inconsistencies in Mr. LeFave's testimony and the fact that Mr. LeFave admitted 
his memory of the events was only about 85%, there was insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate the value of the trailer. (Tr., p.i54, L.i2 - p.i60, L.23l The district court 
took the matter under advisement and issued a Memorandum Decision on Defendant's 
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, denying the motion. (Tr., p.i60, L.24 - p.i6i, L.4; R., 
pp.65-70.) 
Mr. Bennett was eventually sentenced to concurrent sentences of eight years, 
with one and a half years fixed, for grand theft and for being a persistent violator. 
(R., pp.75-77l Mr. Bennett then filed a timely pro se Amended Notice of Appeal and 
Notice of Appeal from the district court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.79-89.) 
Mr. Bennett also filed a timely Rule 35 motion requesting his sentence be reduced to 
8 Because this Court will not substitute its views regarding the credibility of witness and the weight of the 
evidence on appeal, and this would be a question of fact regarding the jury to determine the credibility of 
the witnesses and weight of the evidence, this issue is not being pursued on appeal. State v. Crawford, 
130 Idaho 592,595,944 P.2d 727, 730 (Ct. App. 1997), 
9 This has subsequently been corrected by the department of corrections to properly reflect one sentence, 
6 
three years, with one a half years fixed. (R., pp.91-110.) The district court denied 
Mr. Bennett's Rule 35 request. (R., pp.111-114.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to support the jury's verdict 
finding Mr. Bennett guilty of Grand Theft? 
2. Did the district court err in ordering a separate concurrent sentence for the 




The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support The Jury's Verdict Finding 
Mr. Bennett Guilty Of Grand Theft 
A. Introduction 
At trial, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Bennett 
committed the crime of grand theft. Mr. Bennett contends the State failed to establish 
several of the elements required to establish Mr. Bennett had committed theft. The 
State failed to prove that Mr. Bennett took the trailer from Mr. LeFave, that Mr. LeFave 
had a greater ownership interest in the trailer than Mr. Bennett, and that Mr. Bennett 
intended to deprive the owner or appropriate the trailer by moving it. 
B. The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Bennetts 
Conviction Of Grand Theft 
In this case, the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove Mr. Bennett 
was guilty of grand theft because it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Bennett committed a theft by moving the trailer, which was already in his 
possession and which he had made at least one payment toward. An appellate court's 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is limited in scope. 
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 2001). The 
reviewing court will not set aside the judgment of conviction following a jury verdict, if 
"there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found 
that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime 
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beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 594, 944 P.2d 727, 729 
(Ct. App. 1997). 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court will conduct an 
independent review of the evidence in the record to determine whether a reasonable 
mind could conclude that each material element of the offense was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Willard, 129 Idaho at 828,933 P.2d at 117; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 
104, 822 P.2d at 1001. The Court will not substitute its views for that of the jury when 
determining "the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and 
the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Crawford, 130 Idaho at 595, 
944 P.2d at 730. Furthermore, the Court will consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution. Id. In State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 937 P.2d 960 
(Ct. App. 1997), it was noted that, "[e]vidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable 
trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of 
fact has been proved." Id. at 135, 937 P.2d at 961. 
This case is about a business transaction gone awry and the criminal 
proceedings that flowed from the breach of contract. In the context of criminal actions 
arising out of contractual obligations, there has evolved a tradition against enforcing civil 
contractual obligations through criminal proceedings. State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 50, 
501 P.2d 727, 734 (1972); State v. Henninger, 130 Idaho 638,642,945 P.2d 864, 868 
(Ct. App. 1997). This is reflected in the Idaho State Constitution, article I, section 15, 
which prohibits the "imprisonment for debt in this state except in cases of fraud." Idaho 
Const. art I, § 15. The reasons underlying this tradition include "the improbability of 
preventing honest insolvency by threat of prosecution, the danger of discouraging 
10 
healthy commercial risk-taking or of obtaining unjust convictions by hindsight, the futility 
of imprisoning a debtor unable to pay, and the concept that the seller or lender must 
select and accept his risks," Jesser, 95 Idaho at 50, 501 P.2d at 734; Henninger, 130 
Idaho at 642, 945 P,2d at 868, 
In Henninger, the Idaho Court of Appeals was faced with the question of whether 
the defendant had committed theft by unauthorized control as provided in I.C, § 18-
2403(3), when the defendant failed to make payments on the installment contract for the 
pickup he purchased, Henninger, 130 Idaho at 640-42,945 P.2d at 866-868, In making 
its determination that there was not substantial competent evidence to convict 
Mr. Henninger of the crime alleged, the Court noted that when Mr, Henninger drove the 
pickup away from the dealership he was the owner of the vehicle and his control was 
authorized, Id, at 641-42, 945 P,2d at 867-868, The Court went on to conclude that 
absent a more explicit expression by the legislature that it intended to abandon the 
customary separation of criminal law and civil contract enforcement, theft by 
unauthorized control was not intended "to encompass possession by a debtor who, by 
defaulting on a payment, has become contractually obligated to return the collateral to 
the creditor" or that it "intended the theft statute to be a mechanism that would aid the 
repossession efforts of secured creditors," Id, at 642,945 P.2d at 868, 
Furthermore, in State v, Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 935 P,2d 183 (Ct. App, 1997), the 
Court of Appeals was asked to determine the extent to which article I, section 15, of the 
Idaho Constitution, which prohibits criminal charges for the failure to pay a debt, applies 
when the defendant is charged with theft by deception and theft by false promise, Id, at 
928-29, 935 P,2d at 191-92, The Court noted that this provision "is intended to prohibit 
11 
imprisonment over disputes which are contractual in nature." Id. at 928, 935 P.2d at 
191. The Court cited State v. Cochrane, 51 Idaho 521, 6 P.2d 489 (1931), and found 
that these specific types of theft crimes were constitutional under Cochrane where they 
included "a component of dishonesty or falsehood" and thereby "advance the state's 
interest in preserving 'good morals and honest dealing.'" Id. at 929, 935 P.2d at 192 
(quoting Cochrane, 51 Idaho at 527,6 P.2d at 491.) 
Here, the dispute was contractual in nature and Mr. Bennett was not charged 
with theft by deception, theft by false pretenses, or theft by unauthorized control like the 
cases above, but was simply charged with grand theft under the general portion of theft 
statute, and the instructions submitted to the jury only required the jury to find 
Mr. Bennett guilty of a general theft over $1,000. (See Jury Instructions Nos. 13, 17.) 
The elements of the crime of theft as charged in this case were: 
1. On or about October 30, 2004 
2. in the State of Idaho 
3. the defendant William Lynn Bennett, wrongfully took property 
described as: at 1962 travel trailer, 
4. from an owner, and 
5. the defendant took the property with the intent to deprive an owner 
of the property or to appropriate the property. 
(Jury Instruction No. 13.) The thrust of the State's case was that Mr. Bennett committed 
theft when he moved the trailer to Washington without Mr. LeFave's permission. (Supp. 
Tr., p.11, L.10 - p.12, L.16.) However, this theory fails to support Mr. Bennett's 
conviction of grand theft on the following three elements: (1) that Mr. Bennett wrongfully 
took the property, because the property was in Mr. Bennett's possession so it could not 
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be "wrongfully" taken by him; (2) that the property was taken from an owner, because 
Mr. Bennett had contracted with Mr. LeFave for the trailer and was ostensibly the owner 
of the trailer; and (3) that Mr. Bennett took the property with the intent to deprive the 
owner of the property or to appropriate the property, because Mr. Bennett did not have 
the requisite intent since he possessed and believed he owned or had an ownership 
interest in the trailer. Therefore, as discussed below, Mr. Bennett contends the State 
failed to establish the material elements of the crime in this case to support his 
conviction. 
1. There Was Not Substantial Competent Evidence To Conclude That 
Mr. Bennett Wrongfully Took The Property, Because The Property Was 
Already Lawfully In His Possession 
Idaho Code section 18-2402 defines obtaining property as bringing "about a 
transfer of interest or possession, whether to the offender or to another." 'd. Here, this 
had already occurred lawfully when Mr. LeFave brought the travel trailer to the property 
where Mr. Bennett was living. (See Tr., p.29, L.24 - p.30, L.6.) Once Mr. LeFave 
dropped off the trailer at Ms. Elliger's property, the trailer was in Mr. Bennett's 
possession and was under his control to live in, to care for, etc. This is similar to 
Henninger, where the court found once the defendant drove off in the vehicle it was in 
his control. 'd. at 641, 945 P.2d at 867. The court noted that under the terms of the 
agreement, the dealership had "no further right to possession except to the extent that it 
would be entitled to repossess the vehicle upon default by terms of the security 
agreement." 'd. 
However here, unlike Henninger, there was not even an agreement reserving the 
right for Mr. LeFave to repossess the vehicle upon default. (See Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.30, 
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L.2.) Although it was agreed that the physical title would not be given to Mr. Bennett 
until he made full payment, there was nothing specifying that Mr. LeFave had a right to 
enter the defendant's property and regain control of the trailer. (See Tr., p.28, L.21 -
p.30, L.2.) To find that Mr. Bennett wrongfully took the trailer that was lawfully in his 
possession, would require that the owner of any vehicle still making payments to the 
creditor can be held liable for theft of vehicle if they quit making payments even though 
they lawfully obtained possession of the vehicle. See Henninger, 130 Idaho at 641-42, 
945 P.2d at 867-68. Therefore, Mr. Bennett contends the State failed to provide 
sufficient evidence that he unlawfully took or obtained the trailer. 
2. There Was Not Substantial Competent Evidence To Conclude That 
Mr. Bennett Took The Trailer From An Owner 
The jury instructions further defined an "owner" as "any person who has a right to 
possession of such property superior to that of the defendant" in the jury instructions. 
(Jury Instruction No. 15.) Although the State argued at trial that this element was met 
because Mr. LeFave testified that he owned the trailer and the trailer was still titled in 
his name (Supp. Tr., p.12, Ls.2-4), Mr. Bennett submits that the evidence presented at 
trial was insufficient to establish that Mr. LeFave's interest in the trailer was not superior 
to that of Mr. Bennett's. 
In Jesser, the court noted that under the uniform commercial code, "title is 
deemed to pass to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his 
performance with to physical delivery of the goods, unless the parties explicitly agree 
otherwise." Jesser, 95 Idaho at 51, 501 P.2d at 735 (citing I.C. § 28-2-401(2) which 
currently states that "[u]nless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the 
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time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the 
physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even 
though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place."). Here, 
Mr. LeFave delivered the trailer to Mr. Bennett at the beginning of this transaction; 
therefore, title had passed at that point and Mr. Bennett continued to make payment to 
Mr. LeFave after this occurred. (See, Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.30, L.2.) By accepting partial 
payment for the trailer and moving the trailer to Mr. Bennett's property, Mr. LeFave was 
transferring ownership of the trailer to Mr. Bennett. 
Additionally, in Henninger, the Court found that although it could legitimately be 
argued that a party holding a security interest in a property becomes the "owner" upon 
the defendant's default this result was likely not the intention of the legislature because 
it would render anyone who misses a payment on a secured credit purchase guilty of 
criminal conduct. Id. at 641, 945 P.2d at 867. Although here there was no evidence 
presented at trial establishing that Mr. LeFave even had a security interest in the trailer, 
even if he did, Mr. Bennett's default does not render Mr. LeFave's ownership interest 
superior to that of Mr. Bennett. (See Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.30, L.2.) Therefore, the State 
failed to establish that Mr. LeFave'S ownership interest in the trailer was superior to 
Mr. Bennett's. 
3. The State Failed To Prove That Mr. Bennett Wrongfully Took The Trailer 
With The Intent To Deprive The Owner Of The Property Or To Appropriate 
The Property 
Finally, the State failed to prove that Mr. Bennett wrongfully took the trailer with 
the intent to deprive the owner of the property or to appropriate the property. (See Jury 
Instructions 13, 14). At trial, the State argued that this element was satisfied because 
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Mr. Bennett failed to pay for the trailer and because Mr. Bennett did not have 
permission to take the trailer. (Supp. Tr., p.12, L.5 - p.13, L.16.) However, both of 
these theories are misguided. 
First, the failure to pay the debt is not enough to justify a conviction of theft 
absent some type of deception or fraud on the part of the defendant. See State v. 
Compton, 92 Idaho 739, 450 P.2d 79 (1969) (stating "a mere debtor-creditor 
relationship coupled with failure to repay does not in itself establish the commission of 
the crime.") If failure to pay was enough to meet this element, it would be exactly what 
article I, section 15, of the Idaho State constitution was designed to prevent because it 
would be incarcerating someone simply for failing to pay on an obligation or debt. 
Furthermore, the State's theory that Mr. Bennett did not have permission to take 
the trailer and thereby deprived the owner of the property does not provide the requisite 
intent because by that point, Mr. Bennett already had lawful possession of the trailer 
and was the owner. (See Supp. Tr., p.12, L.5 - p.13, L.16.) The intent required to 
deprive the owner of his property "must exist at the time of the wrongful taking or 
stealing." State v. Bassett, 86 Idaho 277, 385 P.2d 246 (1963). See also Jesser, 95 
Idaho at 51, 501 P.2d at 735. Here, as argued above, Mr. Bennett was lawfully in 
possession of the trailer once Mr. LeFave dropped the trailer off at the specified lot for 
his use. (See Section I(B)(1) supra.) Additionally, the State alleged the wrongful taking 
occurred when Mr. Bennett moved the trailer, not when he obtained possession of it. 
(Supp. Tr., p.12, L.5 - p.13, L.16.) Finally, as argued above in section I(B)(2), 
Mr. Bennett's ownership interest in the trailer was superior to Mr. LeFave's once the 
trailer was delivered. (See Section I(B)(2) supra.) Therefore, even if Mr. Bennett 
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possessed the requisite intent to deprive Mr. LeFave of the property when he moved the 
trailer, he already had lawful possession of the trailer and had a superior ownership 
interest. One with a superior ownership interest in property does not commit a crime by 
intending to deprive a non-owner, or lesser owner, of possession of that property. 
Therefore, the State failed to provide substantial competent evidence of this element. 
Because the State failed to provide substantial competent evidence that 
Mr. Bennett wrongfully took the property in question, that Mr. Bennett's ownership 
interest was inferior to Mr. LeFave's, and that Mr. Bennett took the property with the 
intent to deprive the owner of the property or to appropriate the property, Mr. Bennett's 
conviction for grand theft cannot be sustained. Therefore his conviction for grand theft 
with a persistent violator enhancement should be vacated. 
II. 
The District Court Erred In Ordering A Separate Concurrent Sentence For The 
Persistent Violator Enhancement 
I.C. § 19-2514 does not create a new crime, but rather provides for greater 
punishment for the underlying conviction. State v. Lopez, 108 Idaho 394,395,700 P.2d 
16, 17 (1985). Therefore, separate sentences should not be imposed for both the crime 
and the persistent violator enhancement. Id. In State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 107,685 
P.2d 837, 848 (Ct. App. 1984), the district court ordered two separate concurrent 
sentences of thirty years for the underlying crime and the persistent violator 
enhancement. Id. On appeal, the Court found the district court erred in imposing 
concurrent sentences and ordered that the judgment be corrected to reflect one single 
sentence of thirty years. Id. Here, the district court ordered two separate distinct 
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sentences, and ordered them to be run concurrently. (R., pp.75-77.) However, the 
district court should have ordered one sentence for the crime charged in this case. 
Therefore, Mr. Bennett's separate concurrent sentence for the persistent violator 
enhancement should be vacated and the judgment corrected to reflect one single 
sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bennett respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for grand 
theft with a persistent violator enhancement because there was insufficient evidence to 
support his conviction. Alternatively, he requests that this Court order that his judgment 
and commitment order be corrected to properly reflect a single sentence, rather than 
separate concurrent sentences for grand theft and persistent violator. 
DATED this 12th day of March, 2008. 
~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
18 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1ih day of March, 2008, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
WILLIAM LYNN BENNETT 
INMATE # 16370 
SICI 
PO BOX 8509 
BOISE ID 83707 
MICHAEL R MCLAUGHLIN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
200 W FRONT ST 
BOISE ID 83702 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
200 W FRONT ST DEPARTMENT 17 
BOISE ID 83702 
STATEHOUSE MAIL 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
--- ~<;7 "\ ~~==~ 
EVAN A. SMITH . 
Legal Secretary 
HMC/eas 
19 
